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THE NEW YORK INDIANS' RIGHT TO
SELF-DETERMINATION
INTRODUCTION
In recent years the American Indian has become increasingly
concerned with asserting his right to self-determination. Indian ac-
tivists use the term in conjunction with the related concept of tribal
sovereignty.1 The demonstrations of November, 1972 at the Bureau
of Indian Affairs were in part motivated by the conviction that the
United States has deprived the Indian of his right to govern his own
affairs and the belief that the Indian must reassert this right if he is
to preserve his cultural identity.2
The struggle for greater self-determination has not gone unheeded
by the several branches of the United States government. President
Nixon's policy statement on Indian affairs reflects his sensitivity to the
issue and provides some encouragement for those who strive for greater
tribal autonomy and less governmental interference.3 Particularly
promising in this respect was the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968,4
which makes the consent of Indian tribes a precondition to assumption
of state jurisdiction over reservation affairs.5 This Act stands in sharp
contrast to those statutes of the early 1950's which gave states juris-
diction over Indian affairs without requiring Indian consent.6 More-
over, courts have strictly construed the consent provisions of the
Act, thereby severely limiting the continued exercise of state juris-
diction over the affairs of certain tribes. For example, a recent United
States Supreme Court decision 7 refused to sanction Montana's con-
1. N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1972, § 4, at 5, col. 1. Self-determination as used in
this article means the right of Indian tribes to govern their own affairs according to
their laws and with a minimum of interference from local, state or federal governments.
2. Cf. id.; id., Dec. 1, 1972, at 27, col. 2.
3. R. Nixon, Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs, July 8, 1970, in
PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 564, 565-69 (1970).
4. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301 et seq. (1970).
5. Id. § 1326.
6. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1970); 25 U.S.C. §§ 232-33 (1970); 28 U.S.c. §
1360 (1970).
The Umatilla tribe of Oregon became subject to state jurisdiction in 1953 under
the terms of 18 U.S.C. § 1162 and 28 U.S.C. § 1360. The tribe is dissatisfied with
state jurisdiction and is presently endeavoring to get the Oregon legislature to retrocedejurisdiction to the federal government. 1 TRANSITION, Sept., 1972, at 8.
7. Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1972). See Comment, State and
Tribal Courts in Montana: The Jurisdictional Relationship, 33 MONT. L. REv. 277
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tinued assumption of civil jurisdiction over the Blackfeet tribe even
though the tribal council had passed a resolution consenting to the
exercise of state jurisdiction." The Court held that Montana lacked
jurisdiction because it had failed to take "affirmative legislative ac-
tion" as required by a 1953 act,9 and because the tribe had failed to
comply with the more exacting consent standards of the Indian Civil
Rights Act.10 This decision and others by both the Supreme Court"
and state courts12 have demonstrated a willingness to allow tribal
institutions to control their own affairs, at least in the absence of a
state's strict compliance with federal legislation conferring jurisdiction.
New York Indians' 3 are also concerned with their right to self-
determination. Recently the Seneca Constitutional Rights Organization
brought an action in federal district court in an effort to prevent the
construction of a toy factory on a Seneca reservation.'4 The Organiza-
(1972). See generally Comment, State Civil Power Over Reservation Indians, id.
at 291.
8. 400 U.S. at 425.
9. Id. at 427.
10. Id. at 429-30.
11. E.g., Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
12. E.g., Blackwolf v. District Court, - Mont. -, 493 P.2d 1293 (1972).
13. Today there are approximately 10,000 Indians living on reservations in New
York State. The Seneca Indians own three reservations-the Allegany, Cattaraugus, and
Oil Spring reservations (enrolled members: 4,373; total acreage: 44,320); the Tona-
wanda reservation is owned by the Tonawanda Band of the Seneca Nation (enrolled
members: 824; acreage: 7,549); the Tuscarora reservation is owned by the Tuscarora
(acreage: 5,700); the Onondaga reservation is owned by the Onondaga Indians (en-
rolled members: 1,132; acreage: 7,300); and the Saint Regis reservation is owned by
the Saint Regis Mohawks (enrolled members: 2,220; acreage: 38,390). There are two
small reservations on Long Island owned by the Shinnecock (population: 300; acreage:
400) and the Poosepatuck Indians (population 75; acreage: 60). Two other tribes
have members residing in New York State but do not own reservations: the Oneidas
(enrolled members: 469) who reside with the Onondagas, and the Cayugas (popula-
tion: 303) who reside with the Senecas. N.Y. DEP'T OF SOCIAL SERVICES, THE INDIAN
TODAY IN NEW YORK STATE 1-6 (1970). All but the Shinnecock and Poosepatuck
reservations are recognized by the federal government. N.Y. JOINT LEGISLATIVE COAIA.
ON INDIAN AFFAIRS [hereinafter cited as JOINT COMMITTEE], N.Y. LEo. Doc. No. 6 at
13-14 (1962).
For general background information on the New York Indians, see Manley, New
York Indian Reservations in JOINT COMMITTEE, N.Y. LEO. Doc. No. 64 at 9-12
(1948); J. REEVES, SENECAS AND OTHER INDIANS OF THE Fivn NATIONS OF Nrw
YORK, H.R. Doc. No. 1590, 63d Cong., 3d Sess. 11-25 (1915) [hereinafter cited as
REEVES REPORT]; J. WHIPPLE, REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
INDIAN PROBLEM OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK APPOINTED BY THE ASSEMIBLY OF
1888, N.Y. LEO. Doc. No. 51 (1889) [hereinafter cited as WHIPPLE REPORT]; F.
COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 416-24 (1941) [hereinafter cited as
HANDBOOK].
14. Seneca Constitutional Rights Organization v. George, 348 F. Supp. 51
(W.D.N.Y. 1972).
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tion feared that the factory would interfere with the Indian way of
life and would diminish the Indians' control over reservation affairs.15
The complaint was dismissed, but the objective was achieved via the
ballot box. The party opposed to construction of the factory won the
tribal elections and has announced that the factory will not be con-
structed on the reservation.16
Those New York Indians who favor greater self-determination may
take heart at the victory achieved in the toy factory dispute. Neverthe-
less, significant expansion of the role of tribal governments will prove
much more difficult. Although there may be uncertainty as to jurisdic-
tional authority over the affairs of certain western tribes, 17 there is no
doubt that New York has both civil and criminal jurisdiction on reser-
vations within the state. Since it became a colony New York has
exercised such jurisdiction over its Indians. As a result, state law gov-
erns many of the internal affairs of the tribe and state courts adjudi-
cate many of the disputes which arise between reservation Indians. 8
In order to asssess what steps might be taken to prepare New York
tribes for a greater degree of self-determination, it is essential to under-
stand the factors which led to the exercise of state jurisdiction. An
analysis of these factors affords insight into the weaknesses of tribal
governments and may provide clues as to what might be done to
strengthen them.
I. SELF-DETERMINATION-CONFLICTING CONCEPTS OF STATE
AND FEDERAL POWER TO DEFINE ITS LiMrrs
Despite language in numerous treaties which indicates that In-
dian tribes once held an international status, Indians on reservations
have never been accorded the full powers of sovereign nations.19
15. Interview with Brian York, legal consultant to the Seneca Constitutional
Rights Organization, in Buffalo, N.Y., Jan. 18, 1973.
16. Akwesasne Notes, Jan., 1973, at 36, col. 2 (Indian activist newspaper, on
file at Buffalo Law Review).
17. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
18. See pt. III infra.
19. See HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 39-43. Tribes have been treated as de-
pendent nations with the federal government assuming the role of protector. For example,
the federal government entered into several treaties with the Indians wherein the gov-
ernment assumed the power to control trade and intercourse with the Indians and to
legislate concerning Indian affairs. For further discussion of the dependent status of
Indian tribes, see id. at 40-43.
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However, the United States Supreme Court has consistently recognized
that Indian tribes, as quasi-sovereign nations, have retained a right
to govern their own affairs.20 This right to self-determination is em-
bodied in what Felix Cohen refers to as the most basic principle of
Indian law:
[T]hose powers which are lawfully vested in an Indian tribe are not,
in general, delegated powers granted by express acts of Congress, but
rather inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been
extinguished.2'
The federal government has extensive power to regulate Indian af-
fairs22 and has used this power to implement policies ranging from
the separation of the tribes from American society to assimilation.23
The courts have often found it necessary to act as the protector of the
Indian's right to self-determination in the face of those legislative and
administrative policies which have endangered its existence.2 4
Although the federal government has paramount power over In-
dian affairs, 25 the states do exercise considerable control over their
Indian populations. State governments' reserved powers over Indian
affairs can be summarized by two propositions:
(1) In matters involving only Indians on an Indian reservation, the
state has no jurisdiction in the absence of specific legislation by
Congress.
(2) In all other cases, the state has jurisdiction unless there is in-
volved a subject matter of special federal concern. 20
The first of the above propositions advances the concept that only
the federal government has the right to define the limits of the Indian's
right to self-determination. Thus, according to the federal concept,
tribal laws and tribal courts govern the domestic affairs of reservations
20. See, e.g., Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S.
376 (1896); United States v. Kagamna, 118 U.S. 375 (1886); Worcester v. Georgia,
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
21. HANDBOOK 122; see Comment, Tribal Self-Government and the Indian Re.
organization Act of 1934, 70 MIcn. L. REv. 955 (1972).
22. See HANDBOOK 89-103; Comment, The Indian Battle for Self-Determination,
58 CALIF. L. REv. 445, 447-52 (1970).
23. Comment, supra note 22, at 455-58.
24. HANDBOOK 122.
25. One source of federal power over Indian affairs derives from the commerce
clause of the Constitution. For a discussion of other sources of federal power, see Com-
ment, supra note 22.
26. HANDBOOK 122.
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in the absence of controlling federal legislation or congressional ap-
proval of state jurisdiction.27
New York's conception of its power to define the limits of its
Indians' right to self-determination was in direct conflict with the fed-
eral concept. It was not generally assumed that tribal law governed
in the absence of federal legislation but rather that "in matters where
the Federal Government had not acted and involving no direct con-
flict with Federal laws, the legislative acts and court decisions of [New
York] State would be upheld."28
The conflict raised the issue of the extent of the state's power to as-
sume jurisdiction over the affairs of its Indians without prior congres-
sional approval. New York did not deny that Indians had a right to
self-determination. Indeed, state courts usually respected Indian cus-
toms and assisted in the enforcement of Indian court decisions. 29 How-
ever, New York did believe that it had the power to define the limits
of the Indian tribes' sovereign powers. Thus, the state passed numer-
ous laws during the nineteenth century which regulated reservation
life. 30 The conflict was not resolved until the mid-twentieth century
when Congress gave its approval to the state's exercise of jurisdiction. 31
Given the conflict between the state and federal concepts, a num-
ber of theories evolved to support New York's position. One such
theory focused on the transfer of power from Great Britain to the colony
of New York and from the colony to the central government.32 This
27. See id. at 117, 123-26.
28. JOINT COMMITTEE, N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 51 at 4 (1944). This principle was
reiterated in a later report. JOINT COMMITTEE, N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 64 at 4 (1948).
The 1948 report cited the following cases as support for the principle: United States
ex rel. Kennedy v. Tyler, 269 U.S. 13 (1925); New York ex rel. Cutler v. Dibble,
62 U.S. (21 How.) 366 (1858).
New York's Attorneys General also operated on the assumption that this principle
was valid.
It is my opinion and that of my predecessors in office that in the absence
of congressional legislation asserting federal jurisdiction over the Indian
reservations of this State, such as the Seven Crimes Act found in 18 U.S.C.
§ 548, the State has the power and duty to keep order upon them. See 1928
Op. Atty. Gen. 121; 1937 Ibid. 113; 1939 Ibid. 189, 223; 1941 Ibid. 266;
1942 Ibid. 211, 380.
1944 N.Y. Arr'y GEN. ANN. REP. 325.
29. See pt. III infra.
30. For a complete listing of all laws governing Indian affairs which were enacted
in the nineteenth century, see WHIPPLE REPORT, supra note 13, at 80-85.
31. See p. 995 infra.
32. For a discussion of the unique status enjoyed by the original colonies in their
dealings with the Indians, see O'Toole & Tureen, State Power and the Passamaquoddy
Tribe: "A Gross National Hypocrisy?", 23 MAINE L. REv. 1, 24-39 (1971).
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theory was developed in Seneca Nation of Indians v. Christie a case
which examined the validity of an 1826 treaty conveying land owned
by the Seneca Nation to the Ogden Land Company.34 The Senecas
claimed that the United States Constitution and the Indian Inter-
course Act of 1802 prohibited anyone other than the United States
government from entering into treaties for the purchase of Indian
land. Thus, the Seneca's claim also attacked the validity of numerous
New York-Indian treaties involving the purchase of Indian land.35
In deciding the validity of these treaties, the court explored the nature
of Indian title and the source of New York's power to deal with the
Indians and to extinguish their right to occupancy. It was noted that
Great Britain owned title to all the land which later became the thir-
teen colonies, and possessed the exclusive right to both regulate deal-
ings with Indian tribes and extinguish Indian occupational rights.
When independence was won, the colonies assumed the rights of the
mother country. Since none of these powers were surrendered when
the colonies signed the Constitution,36 the court concluded that the
treaties at issue were valid. 37
Implicit in the court's analysis in Seneca Nation of Indians v.
Christie was the suggestion that if congressional approval was not re-
quired for the New York-Indian treaties, it was not needed for state
regulation of Indian affairs. State power to alienate Indian land and to
regulate the internal affairs of reservation Indians are separate issues,
though not often treated as such. For instance, New York has main-
tained that because its reservations were never within the national
33. 126 N.Y. 122, 27 N.E. 275 (1891), appeal dismissed, 162 U.S. 283 (1896).
34. 126 N.Y. at 127-28, 27 N.E. at 275.
35. Id. at 135, 27 N.E. at 278. These treaties are reprinted in WHIPPLn RnPORT
190-382.
36. 126 N.Y. at 135-37, 27 N.E. at 278-79.
37. Id. at 146, 27 N.E. at 282.
In 1786 Congress approved a treaty between New York and Massachusetts
wherein:
' * . Massachusetts ceded to ... New York the right of government, sovereignty
and jurisdiction over the whole territory in dispute, and New York ceded to
Massachusetts the right of pre-emption of the soil and to extinguish the Indian
title to about 6,000,000 acres of land in the western part of . . . New York
Id. at 131, 27 N.E. at 276-77. The validity of this treaty was of importance in estab-
lishing the legality of the Ogden Land Company's purchase because the Company had
acquired the right to purchase from others who had in turn acquired it from Massachu-
setts. Id. at 132-33, 27 N.E. at 277.
COMMENTS
domain, the state has the power to regulate affairs which transpire on
that land.8
A second rationale for New York's assumption of jurisdiction in-
volved the state's police power to pass laws governing its internal
affairs. In a series of cases, the United States Supreme Court dealt
with the issue of the extent of New York's police power over its
Indians. Unfortunately, there was no articulation of clear standards
which the state could follow. The Court gave its most sweeping en-
dorsement to the police power rationale in New York ex rel. Cutler v.
Dibble.39 This case involved an action brought by a district attorney to
remove the petitioner, a white man, from reservation land. The peti-
tioner challenged the validity of the state statute, which barred non-
Indians from residing on reservations, on the ground that the state
lacked the authority to enact such a statute without congressional ap-
proval. The Supreme Court found that the state statute was valid.
The statute in question is a police regulation for the protection
of the Indians from intrusion of the white people .... [T]he State of
New York had the power of a sovereign over their [Indians'] persons
and property, so far as it was necessary to preserve the peace ....
The power of a State to make such regulations ... is absolute, and
has never been surrendered. 40
The Court, however, circumscribed the police power theory eight
years later in The New York Indians.41 The case involved the validity
of two state statutes which provided for the taxation of Seneca reserva-
tion lands. Both statutes were held invalid because they conflicted with
rights guaranteed the Senecas in treaties signed by the United States.4 2
In reaching this decision the Court mentioned that New York had mis-
takenly assumed it "might enter upon the reservations in the exercise
of its internal police powers, and deal with them as with any other
portion of its territory. '43 It became evident that the Court was not
going to clearly define the boundaries of legitimate state control when,
38. REE Vss REPORT, supra note 13, at 14; Manley, supra note 13, at 9; see
Gunther, Governmental Power and New York Indian Lands-A Reassessment of A
Persistent Problem of Federal-State Relations, 8 BUFFALO L. REv. 1, 2 (1958). The
federal government also claimed ownership of reservation lands as a source of its
power to control Indian affairs. See Comment, supra note 22, at 450-52.
39. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 366 (1858).
40. Id. at 370.
41. 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 761 (1866).
42. Id. at 771-72.
43. Id. at 767.
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in New York ex rel. Kennedy v. Becker,44 it refused to consider either
the extent of New York's police power over its Indians, or even the
narrower question of the applicability of state fishing regulations on
reservations.
Despite the absence of a clear Supreme Court mandate for its
policies, New York continued to exercise de facto jurisdiction over In-
dian affairs. The state entered into treaties with its Indians without
congressional approval or federal supervision,45 passed numerous laws
regulating their internal affairs,4 6 and expended substantial sums of
money in providing the Indians with social services.47 Neither Con-
gress nor the federal bureaucracy protested these activities until the late
1940's when it was maintained that the federal government alone had
the power to delineate the scope of the New York Indians' right to
self-determination. 48 Notwithstanding this belated assertion, it is diffi-
cult to deny that federal inaction did not implicitly lend support to
New York's activities. 49
Lastly, New York claimed that its Indian Law was enacted at the
request of various Indian tribes, expressly mentioning the Senecas and
the Tonawanda Band of Senecas. 0 The Seneca's request originated in
the preamble to the Seneca constitution of 1848 which reads inter alia:
"we ...implore ... the State of New York to aid in providing us
with laws under which life shall be possible."' In 1927, however, the
New York Court of Appeals examined the source of New York's
authority to make laws governing the Seneca Nation. Construing the
44. 241 U.S. 556, 564 (1916).
45. HANDBOOK 420 n.24 & accompanying text. For the text of several New York-
Indian treaties, see WHIPPLE REPORT 190-382.
46. See note 30 supra.
47. Hearings on S. 1683, S. 1686, S. 1687 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1948) [hereinafter
cited as 1948 Hearings]; JOINT COMMITTEE, N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 64 at 7 (1948).
48. 1948 Hearings 211-12.
49. See H. LEHMAN, CONFERRING JURISDICTION ON THE COURTS OF NnW YORK
WITH RESPECT TO CIVIL ACTIONS BETWEEN INDIANS OR TO WHICH INDIANS ARE
PARTIES, S. REP. No. 1836, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1950); REEVES REPORT, supra
note 13, at 15; JOINT COMuTTEE, N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 15 at 5 (1959); id., N.Y.
LEG. Doc. No. 51 at 3-4 (1944); cf. id., N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 64 at 7 (1948); 1948
Hearings 192.
50. 1948 Hearings 191. The fact that the Tonawanda reservation is held in trust
by the State of New York for the Tonawanda Indians has given New York broader
powers over that reservation than others. See United States v. National Gypsum Co.,
141 F.2d 859, 862 (2d Cir. 1944); 1944 N.Y. ATT'V GEN. ANN. REP. 325.
51. Quoted from Patterson v. Seneca Nation, 245 N.Y. 433, 441, 157 N.E. 734,
737 (1927).
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above request narrowly, the court concluded that it did not result in
the abrogation of the customary law of the Seneca Nation and the
application of New York common law to reservation affairs.5 2
It has never been explicitly stated that the Seneca's request for state
laws encompassed other New York tribes, but language in Andrews v.
State53 suggests that the state may have acted upon this belief.
The Government has frequently recognized the right of the State
to deal with Indians within its boundaries... but much of this recog-
nition with reference to the Six Nations flows from exercise of police
power and came after the adoption of their constitution by the Seneca
Nation in 1848.r 4
At the time the state legislation was enacted it was doubtful that
an Indian tribe could consent to the assumption of state jurisdic-
tion without federal permission.5 However, even assuming consent was
possible, it is questionable whether it was so broad in scope as to sup-
port the body of state law 6 enacted on this theory. Nevertheless, subse-
quent events obviated the need for New York to justify its exercise
of power over Indian affairs.
II. RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN STATE
AND FEDERAL CONCEPTS
A. Uncertainty as to the Legality of New York State's Indian Policy
The confusion engendered by congressional inaction and the ab-
sence of clearly defined Supreme Court guidelines reached its apex in
the early twentieth century. In 1915, an amendment was proposed to
the state's constitution which would have abolished Indian courts,
abrogated customary law, and extended state law and state court juris-
diction to the reservations.5 7 Although the amendment was not adopted,
confusion would still have persisted since the amendment could have
been challenged on the grounds that it exceeded state powers and vio-
lated United States' treaty obligations. In 1922, Justice Pound of the
52. Id. at 443, 157 N.E. at 738.
53. 192 Misc. 429, 79 N.Y.S.2d 479 (Ct. C1. 1948), aff'd mem., 276 App. Div.
814, 93 N.Y.S.2d 705 (4th Dep't 1949).
54. 192 Misc. at 434, 79 N.Y.S.2d at 485; cf. GUNTHER, supra note 38, at 8.
55. HANDBOOK 120.
56. See note 30 supra.
57. GUNTHER, supra note 38, at 12-13.
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New York Court of Appeals took note of the dubious constitutionality
of the proposed amendment and of the questionable legality of New
York's assumption of jurisdiction over its Indians. He concluded that
Congress alone can act effectively, unless the more recent deci-
sions of the Supreme Court be distinguished so as to except the New
York Indians from their effect and to recognize "the exclusive
sovereignty and jurisdiction" of the State of New York over them. 8
The reality of federal supremacy was coming to the fore, yet the hope
for a United States Supreme Court determination validating New York's
position lingered on.
In 1942, the Second Circuit made it clear that congressional ap-
proval of New York's conduct was the only means to eliminate the
uncertainty. United States v. Forness0 involved an action brought by
the United States on behalf of the Seneca Indians to cancel federally
authorized leases of reservation land for nonpayment of rent. The de-
fendant-lessee, who was eight years in arrears, tendered payment after
the Council of the Seneca Nation had passed a resolution which can-
celed his lease. The Council refused the tender and proceeded to
trial. The defendant argued that under state law the case should be
dismissed because payment had been tendered before the court reached
a judgment. 0 The district court refused to apply state law, 1' and in-
stead rendered judgment for the defendant on the common law ground
that his tender of payment prevented forfeiture of his lease.02 The
court of appeals agreed with the district court's determination as to
the inapplicability of state law: "state law does not apply to the In-
dians except so far as the United States has given its consent."08 It held
that the Council's action in canceling the lease was proper and re-
manded with judgment for the plaintiff upon condition that the
Council hold open its offer of a new lease for sixty days following
entry of the judgment.6 4
In the course of its opinion the circuit court indulged in a lengthy
discussion of the common law principles governing landlord-tenant
58. Pound, Nationals Without A Nation: The New York State Tribal Indians,
22 COLUm. L. REV. 97, 102 (1922).
59. 125 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1942), rev'g 37 F. Supp. 337 (W.D.N.Y. 1941).
60. Id. at 932.
61. 37 F. Supp. at 341.
62. Id. at 344.
63. 125 F.2d at 932.
64. Id. at 943.
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relations which had formed the basis for the district court's decision
below.0 5 In this context, reaffirmation of the inapplicability of state
law seemed ancillary. The statement was not ignored by state courts,
however, and, in the eyes of New York officials, had a devastating ef-
fect on the contention that the state's Indian Law was valid. 5
In response to Forness, New York established the Joint Legislative
Committee on Indian Affairs (hereinafter referred to as the Joint Com-
mittee), whose principal task was to resolve the issue of state juris-
diction over Indian affairs. In 1945, the Joint Committee drafted two
bills which provided for the transfer of jurisdiction over civil and
criminal affairs from the federal government to the state. 67 The bills
were submitted to the Federal Office of Indian Affairs for consideration,
and, at the request of the Joint Committee, the state submitted the bills
to the United States Congress.68
B. The Transfer of Jurisdiction
The Joint Committee's bills provided the basis for the federal legis-
lation which gives New York general jurisdiction over Indian reserva-
tions. 0 Specific approval of the state's exercise of civil jurisdiction was
65. Id. at 933-41.
66. See 1948 Hearings 80; JOINT COMMITTEE, N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 64 at 5
(1948); id., N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 51 at 4 (1944); GUNTHER, supra note 38, at 14-17.
67. The bills are set forth in JOINT COMMITTEE, N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 51 at 6-7
(1945).
68. Id. at 3-5.
69. 25 U.S.C. § 232 (1970):
Jurisdiction of New York State over offenses committed on reservations
within State.
The State of New York shall have jurisdiction over offenses committed
by or against Indians on Indian reservations within the State of New York
to the same extent as the courts of the State have jurisdiction over offenses
committed elsewhere within the State as defined by the laws of the State:
Provided, That nothing contained in this section shall be construed to deprive
any Indian tribe, band, or community, or members thereof, hunting and fish-
ing rights as guaranteed them by agreement, treaty, or custom, nor require
them to obtain State fish and game licenses for the exercise of such rights.
For comments on the effect of section 232 as seen by state officials, see JOINT
COMMITTEE, N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 39 at 3-5 (1949); 1948 N.Y. ATT'Y GEN. ANN.
REP. 249.
25 U.S.C. § 233 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as section 233]:
Jurisdiction of New York State courts in civil actions.
The courts of the State of New York under the laws of such State shall
have jurisdiction in civil actions and proceedings between Indians or between
one or more Indians and any other person or persons to the same extent as the
courts of the State shall have jurisdiction in other civil actions and proceed-
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embodied in section 233 of the federal Indian law. This legislation did
not expand New York's jurisdiction to new subject matter. In fact, a
number of provisos were included to preserve a measure of federal and
tribal authority. The legislation was an ex post facto validation of
jurisdiction which New York had exercised for years30
State and federal governments held differing views on the scope of
the right to self-determination, as illustrated by their stances on the
proviso in section 233 which recognized the applicability of customary
law to civil disputes involving reservation Indians.71 New York did
not favor outright abolition of all Indian customary law and tribal
institutions. Indeed, for years New York courts had recognized the ap-
plicability of customary law in resolving certain disputes between
reservation Indians and had enforced the judgments of tribal courts3 2
However, state spokesmen were generally of the opinion that the In-
dians should not be left to manage their own affairs without a
substantial measure of state or federal control. The alternative of
ings, as now or hereafter defined by the laws of such State: Provided, That the
governing body of any recognized tribe of Indians in the State of New York
shall have the right to declare, by appropriate enactment prior to September
13, 1952, those tribal laws and customs which they desire to preserve, which,
on certification to the Secretary of the Interior by the governing body of such
tribe shall be published in the Federal Register and thereafter shall govern
in all civil cases involving reservation Indians when the subject matter of such
tribal laws and customs is involved or at issue, but nothing herein contained
shall be construed to prevent such courts from recognizing and giving effect
to any tribal law or custom which may be proven to the satisfaction of such
courts: Provided further, That nothing in this section shall be construed to
require any such tribe or the members thereof to obtain fish and game licenses
from the State of New York for the exercise of any hunting and fishing rights
provided for such Indians under any agreement, treaty, or custom: Provided
further, That nothing herein contained shall be construed as subjecting the
lands within any Indian reservation in the State of New York to taxation for
State or local purposes, nor as subjecting any such lands, or any Federal
or State annuity in favor of Indians or Indian tribes, to execution on any
judgment rendered in the State courts, except in the enforcement of a judgment
in a suit by one tribal member against another in the matter of the use or
possession of land: And provided further, That nothing herein contained
shall be construed as authorizing the alienation from any Indian nation, tribe,
or band of Indians of any lands within any Indian reservation in the State
of New York: Provided further, That nothing herein contained shall be
construed as conferring jurisdiction on the courts of the State of New York
or making applicable the laws of the State of New York in civil actions
involving Indian lands or claims with respect thereto which relate to trans-
actions or events transpiring prior to September 13, 1952.
70. JOINT COMMITTEE, N.Y. LEo. Doc. No. 64 at 7 (1948); 1948 Hearings 192.
71. See material cited note 69 supra.
72. See pt. III infra.
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strengthened tribal government was regarded as a theoretical and
unrealistic possibility.73 New York thus opposed inclusion of the pro-
viso for fear that it would confuse the jurisdiction issue, preferring to
leave the matter to the state legislature and state courts.74 Accordingly,
the Joint Committee's bills contained no mention of the continued ap-
plicability of customary law.7 5
The Interior Department showed somewhat more concern for pre-
serving tribal sovereignty than did New York. In a letter to the Joint
Committee concerning the proposed grant of jurisdiction, the Depart-
ment stated that it favored the transfer of jurisdiction to New York
and expressed the hope that Indians would consent to the new legis-
lation.7 6 In the absence of that consent, the Department requested as-
surance that the Indians' objections were not "justified. ' 77 Neverthe-
less, the Department originally proposed a bill which would have
granted New York jurisdiction "so far as such [state] laws are consistent
with . . . laws and ordinances of the Indian tribes within the State.173
The Department subsequently revised its proposal and, as modified,
it was included in section 233.7 9
C. Indian Reaction to the Proposed Legislation
Despite the fact that the legislation did not expand New York's
jurisdiction over tribal affairs, Indian opposition to the bills was nearly
unanimous during congressional hearings., In some instances Indians
expressed a general fear of change arising out of uncertainty as to the
effect the legislation would have on tribal governments.8 0 Some con-
tended that there was no need for the legislation because the Indians
and the state had always been cooperative. 81 Others expressed fears that
73. JOINT COMMITTEE, N.Y. LEG. Doe. No. 51 at 3 (1945); see id., N.Y. LEG.
Doc. No. 64 at 5 (1948).
74. 1948 Hearings 194.
75. JOINT COMMIrTTEE, N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 51 at 6, 7 (1945).
76. Letter from Abe Fortas to Leighton Wade, Jan. 2, 1945, in JOINT COMMITTEE,
N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 51 at 8 (1945).
77. Id. The Indians' objections are discussed at pp. 997-99 infra.
78. JOINT COMMITTEE, N.Y. LEG. Doe. No. 51 at 9 (1945).
79. For the Joint Committee's appraisal of the intended effect of the Department
of Interior's proviso on customary law, see JOINT COMMITTEE, N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 39 at
5-6 (1949). For the New York Attorney General's formal opinion on section 233, see
1950 N.Y. ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 206. For a statement of the Department of In-
terior's position on the customary law proviso, see 1948 Hearings 8-9, 210-11.
80. 1948 Hearings 38, 101.
81. Id. at 37.
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the new legislation would enable the state to tax reservation land, 2
to alienate Indian land, 3 or to escape liability for land claims arising
from illegal land transactions.8 4 These fears were deemed unfounded,
however, because the bills contained provisions to protect such in-
terests. 5
More substantial objections were raised by those Indians who saw
the bills as a threat to their right to self-determination and sensed
that once enacted into law, the bills would finalize the state's control
over reservation affairs.8 6 In most instances this objection was raised
without mention of how the Indians intended to cure defects in their
tribal governments. The Senecas, however, were prepared for the
hearings. Their president recounted extensive tribal meetings held in
an effort to determine the reasons for dissatisfaction with the operation
of the tribal government. At the close of these meetings the Seneca
Nation, with the exception of two members, was united in its support
for the proposition that the Senecas be excluded from the proposed
legislation. Furthermore, the Seneca Nation's Council of Chiefs had
formulated a plan for improving their judicial system which included
such matters as recording customary laws.87
A small number of Indians favored the legislation. Louis Bruce
supported passage of the bills because he believed the absence of law
and order on some reservations had a deleterious effect on Indian
youth."8 One faction of the leadership of the Tonawanda reservation
supported the proposed legislation,89 probably because it claimed legiti-
macy under New York law and the success of its claim rested upon
congressional approval of New York's laws. A few private citizens from
reservations which were experiencing internal power struggles-namely
the Tonawanda90 and Saint Regis91 reservations-supported the legis-
82. Id. at 31.
83. Id. at 88 (attorney representing Tonawanda group opposed to legislation).
84. Id. at 164, 166.
85. The bills contained substantially the same provisos as does section 233, supra
note 69.
86. See 1948 Hearings 23-24, 47-50, 65, 77, 156, 160-62.
87. Id. at 47-50.
88. Id. at 28. Mr. Bruce was a private citizen at the time of the hearings; later he
was appointed Commissioner of Indian Affairs by President Nixon. N.Y. Times, Dec.
1, 1972, at 27, col. 2. After the demonstrations by Indian activists at the Bureau of
Indian Affairs in November, 1972, Mr. Bruce was stripped of his authority. N.Y. Times,
Dec. 3, 1972 § 1, at 1, col. 7.
89. 1948 Hearings 132-40.
90. Id. at 113-15.
91. Id. at 75-77.
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lation because their tribal judicial systems were either functioning
unjustly or not functioning at all.
D. Reasons the Legislation Was Enacted
Despite the opposition of the overwhelming majority of New York
Indians, the legislation was enacted into law. It would be improper to
conclude that passage occurred because the federal government wished
to avoid expenditures on New York Indians or because the white men
who made the laws were totally insensitive to Indian views. While both
of these factors may have influenced the outcome, there were more
basic reasons involving weaknesses in the tribal governments and phi-
losophies underlying state and federal policies. A careful study of the
congressional hearings, New York legislative documents on Indian
affairs, and case law reveals a number of recurring concerns which
weighed heavily in the minds of those who were instrumental in enact-
ing the legislation.92
Of major importance was the firm belief, existent at both the
state and federal levels, that assimilation was the best way to resolve
the "Indian problem." 93 The belief in assimilation was long standing
and widely held by members of the state legislature and the state judi-
ciary. It was clearly articulated in the Whipple Report,94 a study com-
92. The conclusions of state and federal officials as to what legislation was needed
to help the Indians may have been based on an erroneous or biased assessment of the
actual state of affairs on the reservations. Nevertheless, it is important to understand
how these officials perceived the situation, for it is their perception of the facts which
ultimately dictated the outcome. Unfortunately, the Indians who spoke at the congres-
sional hearings did not present evidence which substantially contradicted the views of
state and federal officials. Thus, it is difficult to say with certainty what the "facts" were.
93. In the early years of this nation's history Indians were treated as equals;
there was no mention of granting Indians self-determination because they enjoyed
sufficient military might to insure control over their own affairs. After the white man
had conquered the hostile tribes or reduced their strength by engaging them in wars
on his behalf, the policy of protectionism came to the fore. Indians were not sub-
jected to all of the white man's laws because they were regarded as needing protection
from the white man's society. Self-determination was a method of protecting the
Indians, not a right possessed by tribes by virtue of their status as quasi-sovereign
nations. After a period of subjugation the policy of assimilation emerged. It was
grounded on the belief that some Indians had been subjected to the civilizing influence
of a white society long enough to be able to survive in the mainstream of American life
without the protection of state or federal governments. See generally W. BROPHY &
S. ABERLE, TH- INDIAN-AAERICA'S UNFINISHED BuSINESS (1966); HANDBOOK chs.
2-4; O'ToOLE & TUREEN, supra note 32, at 11-12 n.64; Comment, supra note 22, at
445-47, 452-61; Comment, supra note 21, at 955-61.
94. Note 13 supra.
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missioned by the New York Assembly in 1888 to investigate the causes
of the "Indian problem" and to propose solutions to it. The commit-
tee recommended a number of measures 5 to implement the policy of
assimilation and concluded that:
These Indian people have been kept as "wards" or children long
enough. They should now be educated to be men, not Indians ...
when... the Indians of the State are absorbed into the great mass
of the American people ... the "Indian problem" [will] be solved."0
The proposed amendment to the state constitution in 1915 was an
attempt to implement the policy behind the Whipple Report's recom-
mendations.97 State courts took note of the policy of assimilation in ren-
dering their decisions.98 Thus, it is not surprising that the state's policy
of assimilation underlay its quest for congressional approval of its poli-
cies.99 The Joint Committee applauded passage of the criminal juris-
diction bill as a great step forward towards absorption of the Indian
into the general community. 10 0 In its 1962 report the Joint Committee
reviewed its accomplishments and pointed with pride to the steps that
had been taken towards assimilation, indicating that many of them
would have been impossible without sections 232 and 233.101
Assimilation was also the prevailing policy in Washington at the
time this legislation was enacted. °02 The remarks of Senator Watkins
during the course of the hearings clearly reflect this attitude.
95. WHIPPLE REPORT 78. The recommendations included such things as com-
pulsory school attendance for all Indian children, allotment of reservation lands in
severalty, general extension of state law over Indians, and their absorption into citizen-
ship.
96. Id. at 79.
97. See GUNTHER, supra note 38, at 12.
98. See, e.g., Mohawk v. Longfinger, 1 Misc. 2d 509, 149 N.Y.S.2d 36 (Cat-
taraugus County Ct. 1955) (dictum).
These Indians should be brought within our jurisdiction so that in this County
there will be but one law, one allegiance, and one citizenry. It is not fair to
them or to us who live with them to have them subject to one authority
and code of laws, and we to another.
Id. at 510, 149 N.Y.S.2d at 37.
99. See REEVEs REPORT, supra note 13, at 19-21. The desirability and need for
further assimilation was also stressed after enactment of the federal legislation. See
JOINT COMiMITTEE, N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 49 at 9 (1956); id., N.Y. LEo. Doc. No. 41 at
3-5 (1955) (reviews achievements in integrating Indian children via the educational
process); id., N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 66 at 5 (1951).
100. JOINT COMMITTEE, N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 39 at 3 (1949).
101. Id., N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 6 at 20 (1962).
102. See H. LEHMAN, supra note 49, at 3-4. After considering the civil jurisdic-
tion bill the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs concluded that
all citizens of a State should be parts of one social order.., anything which
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Now, it seems to me this is a rather unusual situation, where you
have to have a special jurisdiction within a small group of people in
a large State; you have to have your own special laws and your own
special courts and all that sort of thing, when you claim to be Ameri-
can citizens and you want all the privileges of citizenship. I recognize
your old, ancient rights and that sort of thing, but it seems to me
you have been in the melting pot long enough to be assimilated with
the rest of the population now to be able to live under the same laws
as the rest of us do, get the benefits and take on the responsibilities.103
A number of factors operated to buttress the state's contention
that assimilation was the only reasonable policy to pursue. As a gen-
eral proposition, the state urged that Indian self-government was im-
practical because the reservations were small in size and population,
and the Indians lacked the financial resources and administrative tal-
ents necessary to operate an efficient government. 04 Several Indians
argued the contrary, but their position was difficult to maintain in
light of statements which alleged that tribal courts were not operating
justly and efficiently on those reservations where they did exist. 0 5
Moreover, tribal courts were nonexistent on many reservations. 0 6 In
a letter to the subcommittee, George Grobe, United States Attorney
for the Western District of New York, maintained that general law-
lessness prevailed on the reservations, and implied that state officials
and Indian leaders were powerless to combat it under existing legis-
lation. 07 The Joint Committee's representative affirmed Mr. Grobe's
statement, 08 and the Seneca Nation's president admitted its validity. 0 9
conflicts with this principle should be brought into conformity therewith . . .
all the citizens within a State should be . . . under the jurisdiction of a com-
mon code of laws ....
Id.
103. 1948 Hearings 54.
104. Id. at 81, 215; JOINT COMMITTEE, N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 64 at 6 (1948).
105. See, e.g., 1948 Hearings 8, 107, 114-15. Contra, 1948 Hearings 161 (state-
ment of a lawyer who practiced in the courts of the Seneca Nation and found them
to be just and to operate according to principles of law).
106. Only the Seneca Indians and the Tonawanda Band of Senecas have civil
courts recognized by state law. The Onondaga and Tuscarora reservations are governed
by a council of life chiefs, but these chiefs have very limited powers under state law
and these reservations have no courts or written tribal laws. The Saint Regis reserva-
tion has elected chiefs who have limited powers to settle disputes; the reservation has
neither courts nor written tribal laws. 1948 Hearings 7-8; see N.Y. INDIAN LAW §§ 1
et seq. (McKinney 1950) [hereinafter referred to as the Indian Law].
107. Letter from George Grobe to Chairman Butler in 1948 Hearings 46-47.
108. 1948 Hearings 214; see id. 187 (remarks of Representative Reed from New
York).
109. Id. at 48.
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However, he urged that the situation would not have existed had In-
dians been aware of their responsibility for maintaining law and
order."10
A serious problem existed on those reservations which lacked
judicial institutions capable of redressing the grievances of residents.
Only the Seneca and the Tonawanda reservations had peacemakers'
courts. The Saint Regis, Tuscarora, and Onondaga reservations had
none. The Saint Regis reservation had a legally recognized council of
chiefs with the power to settle a narrow range of disputes. The Tusca-
rora and Onondaga reservations both had councils of life chiefs, but
their powers were not recorded in writing and none of the tribes'
members had a clear idea of the nature and the extent of the councils'
traditional powers. Moreover, the councils did not assert their tradi-
tional powers for fear of being deposed."' State 12 and federal' 18 offi-
cials believed that tribal government was, for all practical purposes,
nonexistent on these reservations, and that the residents lacked any
means of redressing grievances. It was assumed by some officials that
these reservations were uninterested in remedying the problems that
existed and the widely-held conclusion was that state jurisdiction was
the only reasonable alternative." 4
Even on those reservations where Indian judicial institutions did
exist, they apparently did not operate efficiently or equitably in a num-
ber of instances. For example, the Seneca peacemakers' courts found it
difficult to enforce their decrees," 5 and were not open to whites or to
members of other tribes residing on Seneca reservations." 0 It was fur-
ther alleged by some Indians that favoritism prevented the courts and
councils from arriving at just decisions."17 Both of these factors un-
doubtedly had the effect of discouraging Indians from resorting to tribal
courts.
110. Id. at 49.
111. Id. at 7-8.
112. See JOINT COMMITTEE, N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 64 at 7 (1948); id., N.Y. LEO.
Doc. No. 51 at 3 (1945).
113. 1948 Hearings 3-4, 7-8.
114. See, e.g., id. at 8.
115. See JOINT COMMITTEE, N.Y. LEO. Doc. No. 57 at 5 (1950); 1948 Hearings
8, 138; JOINT COMMITTEE, N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 64 at 6 (1948). Contra, 1948 Hear-
ings 58-59. See also JOINT COMMITTEE, N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 6 at 35 (1962) (Saint
Regis chiefs unable to get a former clerk to turn over tribal records on departing office).
116. 1948 Hearings 8.
117. Id. at 107-08 (remarks of a Cayuga Indian from the Cattaraugus reservation),
114-15 (remarks of an Indian from the Tonawanda reservation).
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Failure to record customary laws enabled state officials to main-
tain that for the most part there was no system of laws on the reserva-
tions and that the Indians were unlikely to create a comprehensive
legal system; therefore, there was a need for state jurisdiction.1 8 Fed-
eral officials were more inclined to respect customary law and included
a proviso in section 233 giving the tribes two years to record any
customs that they wished to preserve." 9 None of the tribes chose to do
so, a fact which tended to support the view that customary law was
either nonexistent or no longer in use.' 20 It should be noted, however,
that even when customary law was proven to exist it sometimes con-
flicted with what white society considered to be equitable, and may
have worked to the disadvantage of the Indians. For example, the
Joint Committee disapproved of the fact that customary law provided
for divorce without regard to the wishes of the mate and imposed no
duty on the father to support his offspring.' 2'
Other factors which were harmful to the Indians' cause included
the divisions that existed in the leadership of the Saint Regis 22 and
118. See JOINT COMMITTEE, N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 64 at 5 (1948); id., N.Y. LEG.
Doc. No. 15 at 3 (1945); cf. id., N.Y. LEo. Doc. No. 57 at 4 (1950).
119. 1948 Hearings 8-9. Most Senators who debated passage of the civil jurisdic-
tion bill were concerned that Indians have the opportunity to record their customs.
See 96 CONG. REc. 12459-61 (1950).
120. JOINT COMMITTEE, N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 74 at 3 (1953) (committee noted
state courts could recognize Indian customs even though not recorded). Apparently
New York had requested its tribes to record their customs at an earlier date but they
had failed to do so. See 1948 Hearings 218.
121. JOINT COMMITTEE, N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 57 at 4 (1950); see id., N.Y. LEG.
Doc. No. 64 at 5-6 (1948).
Other practices which were found objectionable included the Dead Feast. The
Dead Feast or Tenth Day Feast is an ancient custom among many New York Indians
wherein ten days after a member of a clan dies other clan members assemble and choose
administrators to parcel out the property of the decedent according to custom. It is
possible that the children of a decedent will receive none of the estate. JOINT CoM-
MITTEE, N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 57 at 4 (1950). The report cited the following cases
which supported the proposition that state law, not customary law, applied to distribu-
tion of property on reservations: New York ex rel. Charles v. Blackchief, 8 F. Supp.
295 (W.D.N.Y. 1934) (denial of motion to remove proceeding from state court to
federal court, thereby permitting state court to decide property dispute according to
state law, not Indian custom); Hatch v. Luckman, 64 Misc. 508, 118 N.Y.S. 689
(Sup. Ct. 1909), aff'd, 155 App. Div. 765, 140 N.Y.S. 1123 (4th Dep't 1913) (dis-
cussed at p. 1011 infra).
It is difficult to urge that the Indians should have accommodated their customs
to the white man's notion of justice, for to have done so would have significantly de-
prived them of the right to self-determination. However, the Senecas apparently con-
cluded that, on balance, recording customary laws would have worked to their ad-
vantage. See note 87 supra and accompanying text.
122. See JOINT COMMITTEE, N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 51 at 5, 7 (1944); id., N.Y.
LEG. Doc. No. 64 at 7 (1948); 1948 Hearings 8, 145-46.
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Tonawanda 123 reservations. These divisions motivated a group of In-
dians to support the legislation and enabled the Joint Committee to
assert that a substantial number of Indians recognized the need for the
legislation. 2 4 Furthermore, the divisions probably reinforced the im-
pression that Indians could not manage their own affairs. In addition,
the practical difficulties caused the Indians by white society's inability
or unwillingness to accommodate itself to tribal sovereignty may have
served to convince the Congress that substantial self-government was
impractical. One such difficulty was revealed in a letter to the sub-
committee written by a bank president from Salamanca.125 The letter
stated that in light of the Forness decision the bank would no longer
give loans to Indians, even if they were secured by a chattel mortgage
or by a real estate mortgage on land located off the reservation. Lastly,
the Indians were caught in what state officials regarded as the anomalous
position of desiring continued social services without wanting to be
subject to state laws. 2 6 The consensus was that if Indians wanted bene-
fits from the state, they should be subject to the responsibilities im-
posed by state law. 27
Analysis of the factors which contributed to passage of the federal
legislation affords an appreciation of state and federal attitudes towards
the Indian's right to self-determination and of conditions on New
York reservations which shaped those attitudes. However, in order to
comprehend the degree of New York's involvement in internal tribal
affairs and the judicial reasoning used in support of that involvement,
it is necessary to focus on the role played by state courts in Indian
affairs.
III. CASE ANALYSIS OF NEw YoRK's INVOLVEMENT
IN INTERNAL INDIAN AFFAIRS
One can best understand the extent to which tribal sovereignty
survived the de facto exercise of state civil and criminal jurisdiction
123. See JOINT COMMITTEE, N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 51 at 5, 7 (1944); id., N.Y.
LEG. Doc. No. 64 at 7 (1948) ; 1948 Hearings 132-34.
124. JOINT COMMITTEE, N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 51 at 4-5 (1945). During the course
of congressional debates on the civil jurisdiction bill Representative Reed of New York
implied that only the lawless elements of Indian society opposed the bill, whereas edu-
cated Indians favored it. 96 CONG.REc. 12456 (1950).
125. Letter from E. Vreeland to Senator Butler, Mar. 6, 1948, in 1948 Hearings
201.
126. See JOINT COMMITTEE, N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 51 at 4 (1945).
127. See, e.g., 1948 Hearings 33-35 (remarks of Senator Watkins).
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by a case analysis which focuses on disputes between reservation In-
dians over the ownership of real and/or personal property located on
the reservation. There are a number of reasons for choosing this par-
ticular subject area. First, authorities are of the opinion that this
subject matter falls within the jurisdiction of tribal courts and should
be settled according to customary law.128 Hence, state courts often
feel an obligation to explain why they are assuming jurisdiction in
such cases. Second, the parties to such disputes are usually both In-
dians, the res is located on the reservation, and the character of the
dispute is such that there is no clear overriding state interest in the
state assuming jurisdiction or applying its law. Therefore, it would seem
that state courts would be more willing to recognize Indian sovereignty
in this sphere than in most. Lastly, most reservations have judicial in-
stitutions which claim jurisdiction over the subject matter, and In-
dian customary law exists which conflicts with state law.1 29 The conflict
of jurisdiction and law forces courts to face the issue of tribal
sovereignty squarely, and choose between widely divergent positions.
These cases may involve the determination of two procedural issues
and two substantive issues. The procedural issues are: (1) whether the
state court or the tribal judicial institution has jurisdiction to decide
the matter; and (2) whether Indian customary law or state law applies.
The substantive issues may encompass: (1) a determination of whether
a party is a member of a particular tribe; and if so (2) what his prop-
erty rights are.
For the purpose of analyzing the impact that federal legislation
has had on New York court decisions, the cases will be separated into
those decided prior to 1952, the date the Civil Jurisdiction Act 8 0 be-
came effective, and those decided thereafter.
A. Jurisdiction-Prior to 1952
Perhaps the most important factor governing a state court's deci-
sion as to whether an Indian judicial institution has jurisdiction, and
what the limits of that jurisdiction are, is the court's conclusion as to
the source of the Indian institution's authority to decide disputes. If
128. See, e.g., HANDBOOK 139-41.
129. 1948 Hearings 26; Cf. JOINT COMMITTEFE, N.Y. LEo. Doc. No. 57 at 5
(1950).
130. Note 69 supra.
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the court determines that an Indian court derives its power from a
statute, then that statute will be determinative of whether a reserva-
tion has a judicially cognizable court, and the statute will also define
the scope of the Indian court's jurisdiction. On the other hand, if an
Indian court's power is inherent in the tribe's status as a quasi-sovereign
nation, state law should not be determinative of whether the institu-
tion claiming judicial power is legitimate, and it should not define the
limits of that institution's jurisdiction.
State courts differed in their views as to the source of Indian courts'
authority. In Patterson v. Seneca Nation,'3' the issue was whether a
state court could employ a writ of mandamus to force the council of
the Seneca Nation to enroll the petitioner as a member of the Seneca
Nation and accord him all the personal and property rights of a Seneca
Indian. Since petitioner's mother was a white woman the tribe con-
sidered him to be a white man; thus, under tribal custom he was not
entitled to enrollment in the tribe. 32 In order to decide the issue, the
court explored the sources of New York's authority over Seneca af-
fairs. After citing several cases which lent support to the concept that
Indian tribes are quasi-sovereign nations, 83 the court concluded that
the jurisdiction of the peacemakers' court was derived from the Seneca
constitution and not from the state's Indian Law. 8 4 Since the Indian
Law thus did not define the limits of the peacemakers' court's juris-
diction, 3 5 it was held that "the courts of the State of New York, under
131. 245 N.Y. 433, 157 N.E. 734 (1927). Although the court adopted the
theory that power derived from the status of the tribe, there was no direct conflict
with state law. The court refused to consider whether the legislature had the power to
pass a statute which would have given a state court jurisdiction to issue a writ.
132. Id. at 436, 157 N.E. at 735.
133. Id. at 438-39, 157 N.E. at 735-36.
134. Id. at 444, 157 N.E. at 738.
135. Id. at 446, 157 N.E. at 738-39. See also Mulkins v. Snow, 232 N.Y. 47,
133 N.E. 123 (1921):
The Peacemakers' Court is not a mere statutory local court of inferior juris-
diction. It is an Indian court, which has been recognized and given strength
and authority by statute. It does not owe its existence to the state statute and
is only in a qualified sense a state court.
Id. at 51-52, 133 N.E. at 124; People ex rel. Jimeson v. Shongo, 83 Misc. 325, 144
N.Y.S. 885 (Sup. Ct. 1913), aff'd, 164 App. Div. 908, 148 N.Y.S. 1137 (4th Dep't
1914):
While it is true, of course, that in our Indian Law we have made some
police provisions in reference to the Indians, generally speaking they are
not governed by our laws, and their courts are not inferior courts to our
courts, but are courts of a foreign jurisdiction, over which we have no control.
Id. at 327, 144 N.Y.S. at 887.
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existing laws, have no jurisdiction to control by mandamus order...
the membership of [the Seneca] nation."'136
In Terrance v. Gray37 the court adopted a contrary position after
focusing its attention on the source of tribal power. The case involved
an action in replevin brought in state court to recover damages for
the defendant's allegedly unlawful appropriation of crops growing on
plaintiff's land. Both parties to the action were Indians and the land
was located on the Saint Regis reservation. The defendant argued that
the state court had no jurisdiction because there was a tribal court
empowered to decide the dispute, namely the Council of Chiefs. The
court concluded that the scope of the Council of Chiefs' power as de-
fined by the Indian Law138 did not include the power to settle the dis-
pute, 89 and furthermore that the Council was not a peacemakers' court
within the meaning of the Indian Law. 40 The state court assumed
jurisdiction and rendered judgment for the plaintiff.
136. 245 N.Y. at 446-47, 157 N.E. at 739.
137. 165 App. Div. 636, 151 N.Y.S. 136 (3d Dep't 1915).
138. N.Y. INDIAN LAW § 106 (McKinney 1950).
139. 165 App. Div. at 638, 151 N.Y.S. at 137.
140. Id. at 640, 151 N.Y.S. at 138. Presumably the council would have been
empowered to decide the dispute had it been a peacemakers' court. See N.Y. INDIAN
LAW § 46 (McKinney 1950), as amended, N.Y. INDIAN LAW § 46 (McKinney Supp.
1972). The amended version of section 46 reads as follows:
Peacemakers' courts
The peacemakers for each of the three reservations, the Allegany, the
Cattaraugus and the Tonawanda reservations, shall respectively constitute the
peacemakers' courts thereof, and the eldest peacemaker of each of such courts
shall be the presiding officer thereof. Any two of the peacemakers of any
reservation shall be competent to perform any of the duties or exercise any of
the powers assigned to the peacemakers of such reservation. The peacemakers'
court of each such reservation shall have authority to hear and determine all
matters, disputes and controversies between any Indians residing upon such
reservation, whether arising upon contracts or for wrongs, and particularly
for any encroachments or trespass on any land cultivated or occupied by
any one of them, and which shall have been entered and described in the
clerk's books of records; but they shall not take cognizance of any claim
founded upon any debt or demand originally contracted with a white man.
And said peacemakers shall have power to make all needful rules and by-laws
for notifying and bringing the parties to such matters, disputes and con-
troversies as may arise under the provisions of this section before them,
and for the regulation of all proceedings thereon, and for the hearing
and determination thereof, and for the enforcing obedience to such rules
and by-laws. They shall publicly hear the proofs and allegations of the
parties to such matter, dispute or controversy, and shall publicly declare and
make known their determination therein within four days after such matter,
dispute or controversy shall be finally submitted to them by the parties.
They shall have power to enforce obedience to such rules and by-laws, and
shall have power to issue and enforce the observance of orders or notices for
the appearance and attendance of witnesses before them to testify and give
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Peters v. Tallchief'4l elaborated on the consequences of relying on
state law to define the existence and scope of an Indian court's powers.
The case involved a dispute between two Tuscarora Indians over the
ownership of a farm located on the reservation. The appellate division
concurred with the finding of a justice of the peace that the petitioners
had a right to the property under state law,142 and proceeded to pass
upon the question of whether the petitioner could resort to state courts
for enforcement of her right. It was noted that the Indian Law did
not provide for peacemakers' courts on the Tuscarora reservation and
that none in fact existed. Had state courts lacked jurisdiction the peti-
tioner would have been without a means of enforcing her rights. Con-
cluding that under such circumstances the legislature intended state
courts to assume jurisdiction, the majority construed section 5 of the
Indian Law 43 in such a manner as to give itself jurisdiction. 144 The
evidence in any such matter, dispute or controversy so pending before them,
and may compel the appearance before them of such witness by attachment or
by fine, for not appearing, in the same manner as is now provided by law for
compelling the attendance of witnesses in courts of justices of the peace in
this state. They may administer oaths to witnesses produced by the parties on
any such hearing, and cause them to be examined on oath, and may examine
any party to any such matter, dispute or controversy so pending before them,
on oath as a witness, when such examination shall be required by adverse
party. A peacemakers' court of the Allegany or Cattaraugus reservation shall
also have jurisdiction to grant divorces between Indians residing on such
reservation and to hear and determine all questions and actions between
individual Indians residing thereon involving the title to real estate on such
reservations. If either of the parties to a controversy of which a peacemakers'
court has jurisdiction resides on the Allegany reservation and either of the
other parties resides on the Cattaraugus reservation, the peacemakers' courts
of either reservation has jurisdiction thereof.
A number of courts reached their decisions in accordance with the view that state
law defined the existence and jurisdiction of tribal institutions. See, e.g., Crouse v.
New York Rys., 214 App. Div. 678, 679, 213 N.Y.S. 576, 577 (4th Dep't 1925); In re
Printup's Estate, 121 App. Div. 322, 325, 106 N.Y.S. 74, 76 (4th Dep't 1907); In re
Terrance's Estate, 32 N.Y.S.2d 540, 545 (Sur. Ct. 1942).
141. 121 App. Div. 309, 106 N.Y.S. 64 (4th Dep't 1907).
142. Id. at 310-11, 106 N.Y.S. at 65-66.
143. N.Y. INDIAN LAW § 5 (McKinney 1950), as amended, N.Y. INDIAN LAw
§ 5 (McKinney Supp. 1972). The earlier version of section 5 reads as follows:
Actions in state courts
Any demand or right of action, jurisdiction of which is not conferred
upon a peacemakers' court, may be prosecuted and enforced in any court of the
state, the same as if all parties thereto were citizens.
The amended version of section 5 reads as follows:
Any action or special proceeding between Indians or between one or
more Indians and any other person or persons may be prosecuted and
enforced in any court of the state to the same extent as provided by law for
other actions and special proceedings.
144. 121 App. Div. at 311-12, 106 N.Y.S. at 67.
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county court was reversed and the decision of the justice of the peace
awarding the petitioner possession of the tribal land was affrmed.
The dissent argued that the decision violated the sovereignty that
Indian tribes had retained over their internal affairs,145 and thus gave
justices of the peace the power to award possession of reservation land
to Indians without regard for the customs of the tribe- 48 Judge McLen-
nan predicted that the court's construction of section 5 of the Indian
Law would have the effect of granting
the courts of our State . . . jurisdiction to determine any and all
controversies arising between Indians residing upon their respective
reservations within the State of New York, outside of the Seneca na-
tion, in which a peacemakers' court has been established.1 47
McLennan's prediction proved accurate for the most part. The
Seneca peacemakers' courts were recognized as having jurisdiction over
matters involving the distribution of land as provided by statute.1 48
On the other hand, those tribes which had no statutory provision for a
peacemakers' court fell prey to the construction of section 5 employed
by the court in Peters, and were generally found to have no juris-
diction over disputes between Indians involving property located on
the reservation. The outcome was the same whether a party alleged
the existence of a tribal institution (other than a peacemakers' court)
with jurisdiction to decide the matter,149 or whether no such allegation
was made. 59
A court's conclusion as to the source of power of peacemakers'
courts was generally of primary importance in deciding the issue of
145. Id. at 315, 106 N.Y.S. at 69.
146. Id. at 314, 106 N.Y.S. at 68-69.
147. Id. at 320, 106 N.Y.S. at 73.
148. N.Y. INDIAN LAw § 46 (McKinney 1950), as amended, N.Y. INDrN LAW
§ 46 (McKinney Supp. 1972); see, e.g., Patterson v. Seneca Nation, 245 N.Y. 433, 157
N.E. 734 (1927); Mulkins v. Snow, 232 N.Y. 47, 133 N.E. 123 (1921); Jimeson v.
Pierce, 78 App. Div. 9, 79 N.Y.S. 3 (4th Dep't 1902).
149. Terrance v. Gray, 165 App. Div. 636, 151 N.Y.S. 136 (3d Dep't 1915)
(Saint Regis reservation-elected council of chiefs alleged to have jurisdiction); In re
Printup's Estate, 121 App. Div. 322, 106 N.Y.S. 74 (4th Dep't 1907) (Tuscarora
reservation-tribal council alleged to have exclusive jurisdiction to appoint adminis-
trators for estate of a deceased member of the tribe); In re Terrance's Estate, 32
N.Y.S.2d 540 (Sur. Ct. 1942) (Saint Regis reservation-council of life chiefs alleged
to have jurisdiction).
150. Crouse v. New York State Rys., 214 App. Div. 678, 213 N.Y.S. 576 (4th
Dep't 1925) (wrongful death action brought by an Onondaga Indian, court noting that




subject matter jurisdiction. In those instances where a party before a
state court alleged that the peacemakers' court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction, the court assumed the power to decide whether this was
so.' 5' For disputes involving ownership of property located on the
reservation, such a decision was relatively easy since the Indian Law
expressly provided that peacemakers' courts had subject matter juris-
diction.1 52 If a peacemakers' court had already rendered a decision,
the state court would enforce it.' In one instance a court gave effect
to decisions reached by the administrators appointed at a Dead Feast, 15 4
even though state law did not expressly recognize this institution. 155
Nevertheless, when it appeared that a tribal institution lacked
jurisdiction over the subject matter, as defined by state law, a state
court would interfere by issuing a court order or a writ of prohibi-
tion.156 Thus, in People ex rel. Jamerson v. John,5 7 a peacemakers'
court on the Cattaraugus reservation was prevented from deciding a
dispute as to who were the rightful trustees of the Iroquois Agricultural
Society, a domestic corporation created under state law. The court
adopted the position that the state statute58 conferred and defined the
powers of peacemakers' courts. The tribal court was found to lack juris-
diction over the subject matter 59 and it was held that the issue could
only be decided according to state law in an action maintained by
the state attorney general. Accordingly, a writ of prohibition was
151. See Mulkins v. Snow, 232 N.Y. 47, 52, 133 N.E. 123, 124 (1921).
152. N.Y. INDIAN LAW § 46 (McKinney 1950), as amended, N.Y. INDIAN LAW
§ 46 (McKinney Supp. 1972) ; see note 140 supra.
153. See, e.g., Jimeson v. Pierce, 78 App. Div. 9, 79 N.Y.S. 3 (4th Dep't 1902)
(enforcing decision of the Cattaraugus reservation's peacemakers' court pertaining to a
partition of reservation land); Silverheels v. Maybee, 82 Misc. 48, 143 N.Y.S. 655
(Sup. Ct. 1913) (enforcing order of Allegany reservation peacemakers' court com-
manding defendant to leave land awarded plaintiff by the peacemakers' court); cl.
Woodin v. Seeley, 141 Misc. 207, 252 N.Y.S. 818 (Chautauqua County Ct. 1931),
aff'd, 238 App. Div. 766, 261 N.Y.S. 1042 (4th Dep't 1933) (court granted petitioner's
request for order to remove defendant from land on the Cattaraugus reservation after
petitioner was shown to be rightful owner according to Indian custom).
154. Note 121 supra contains a discussion of the Dead Feast practice.
155. Lyons v. Lyons, 149 Misc. 723, 268 N.Y.S. 84 (Sup. Ct. 1933), aJJ'd, 244
App. Div. 759, 279 N.Y.S. 1020 (4th Dep't 1935) (Onondaga reservation).
156. Hatch v. Luckman, 64 Misc. 508, 118 N.Y.S. 689 (Sup. Ct. 1909), aft'd,
155 App. Div. 765, 140 N.Y.S. 1123 (4th Dep't 1913) (court granted writ of prohibi-
tion to plaintiff preventing peacemakers' court on Tonawanda reservation from pro-
ceeding with determination as to rightful ownership of reservation land).
157. 80 Misc. 418, 141 N.Y.S. 225 (Sup. Ct. 1913).
158. N.Y. INDIAN LAW § 46 (McKinney 1950), as amended, N.Y. INDIAN LAW
§ 46 (McKinney Supp. 1972). For text see note 140 supra.
159. 80 Misc. at 420-21, 141 N.Y.S. at 426-27.
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granted which prevented the peacemakers' court from proceeding to
decide the issue.160
B. Law-Prior to 1952
State courts were divided in their opinions as to whether state law
or customary law governed the descent and distribution of Indian
property. Hatch v. Luckman' 61 represented the minority view that
state law, rather than customary law, governed the distribution of a
deceased Indian's property. An action was brought in state court by
the daughter of a deceased Tonawanda Indian to recover possession
of lands leased to the defendant by the administrators of the decedent's
estate. The administrators, appointed at the Tenth Day Feast to divide
up the estate of the decedent,162 decided that according to Indian
custom the petitioner had no right to the Tonawanda land. They
based their decision on the fact that the petitioner's mother had been
a Seneca from the Cattaraugus reservation, and that under customary
law proprietary rights were determined by the mother's lineage, not
the father's. The state court reached the conclusion that the Tenth
Day Feast was a custom devoid of legal effect as were the actions of
the administrators. 63 Instead of resting its holding on the narrow
ground that the Tonawanda reservation was held in trust by New York
and that, therefore, New York had sovereign power over the reserva-
tion, 64 the court maintained that the New York legislature intended
common law rules, and not customary law, to govern Indian lineage
and inheritance.16 5 One source of support for this sweeping conclu-
sion was the court's observation that civilization had rendered Indian
customs obsolete.'66
Most courts recognized the applicability of Indian customary law
to disputes between Indians over the ownership of property located on
the reservation. This view was concisely stated in Patterson v. Seneca
Nation:6 7 "The ancient usages and customs of the Seneca Nation...
160. Id. at 425, 141 N.Y.S. at 229.
161. 64 Misc. 508, 118 N.Y.S. 689 (Sup. Ct. 1909), aff'd, 155 App. Div. 765,
140 N.Y.S. 1123 (4th Dep't 1913). Contra, United States v. Charles, 23 F. Supp. 346
(W.D.N.Y. 1938).
162. See note 121 supra.
163. 64 Misc. at 517, 118 N.Y.S. at 696.
164. Id. at 514, 118 N.Y.S. at 694.
165. Id. at 526, 118 N.Y.S. at 701-02.
166. Id. at 525, 118 N.Y.S. at 701.
167. See note 131 supra, & accompanying text.
1011
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
except as modified by... appropriate legislation of the nation or State
continued as the law of the Indian land.' u0  Although Patterson did
not overrule Hatch, the court in Woodin v. Seeley' 69 felt that Patterson
had clearly disapproved of the principles set forth in Hatch and re-
fused to follow them. 70 Instead, the Woodin court ordered the re-
moval from the Cattaraugus reservation of the adult offspring of a
Seneca father and a non-Indian mother on the grounds that they had
no right to reside on the reservation under customary law. 1
Courts did not limit the applicability of customary law to those
reservations which had peacemakers' courts. In Lyons v. Lyons,172 the
state court gave effect to decisions reached according to Onondaga
customs in the absence of a peacemakers' court or statutes requiring
recognition of customary law. Thus, for the most part, state courts were
willing to give effect to customary law when it was proven to exist
and when its application would not lead to grossly inequitable results.
C. Law and Jurisdiction-Post 1952
As was noted above, for several years most state courts respected
the jurisdiction of those tribal courts provided for in the state law and
honored the customary law governing the descent and distribution of
property. The enactment of section 233173 did not produce a drastic
change in this state of affairs. While there were still opinions reflecting
a strong belief in the desirability of assimilation even after its passage, 74
there were also indications that state courts were becoming less inclined
to espouse assimilation and more inclined to regard preservation of
tribal distinctiveness as the dominant public policy.175
Jimerson v. Halftown176 interpreted the effect of section 233 on the
jurisdiction of state and tribal courts. The case involved a boundary
168. 245 N.Y. at 443, 157 N.E. at 738.
169. 141 Misc. 207, 252 N.Y.S. 818 (Chautauqua County Ct. 1931).
170. Id. at 211, 252 N.Y.S. at 822.
171. Id. at 215-16, 252 N.Y.S. at 826-27.
172. 149 Misc. 723, 268 N.Y.S. 84 (Sup. Ct. 1933), aff'd, 244 App. Div. 759, 279
N.Y.S. 1020 (4th Dep't 1935).
173. See note 69 supra.
174. See note 98 supra.
175. In re Fischer, 283 App. Div. 518, 521, 128 N.Y.S.2d 886, 889 (3d Dep't
1954); In re Nelson, 68 Misc. 2d 614, 618, 327 N.Y.S.2d 774, 778 (Suffolk County
Ct. 1972).
176. 44 Misc. 2d 1028, 255 N.Y.S.2d 627 (Sup. Ct. 1963), aff'd, 22 App. Div. 2d
417, 255 N.Y.S.2d 959 (3d Dep't 1965).
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dispute between two Seneca Indians residing on the Cattaraugus reser-
vation. The first time the tribal council decided the issue it awarded
one party 3.5 acres and the other party 15.7 acres. The second time
the dispute was brought before the council it reversed itself, and ordered
the parties to bring the dispute to the state court of claims, which
awarded all of the acreage to the petitioner.177 The latter thereupon
applied for an order to release the funds the state had paid for the
land.17 Respondent argued that the first determination of the council
was conclusive of the petitioner's rights and was res judicata as to the
application. 79 Petitioner claimed that the council had the power to
overturn its earlier decision and refer the matter to the court of
claims. s° The court noted that peacemakers' courts no longer had ex-
clusive jurisdiction over the subject matter but, by virtue of section
233 and the amendment of section 5 of the Indian Law in 1953,181
possessed concurrent jurisdiction with the state courts. 8 2 However the
court also noted that once peacemakers' courts had assumed juris-
diction, state courts were not free to interfere by claiming concur-
rent jurisdiction; 83 hence, the request to overturn the tribal council's
latter decision was refused. The court also held that the council's first
decision, having been properly set aside, was not res judicata as to the
rights of the parties, and ordered payment of the funds to petitioner. 8 4
State courts have generally continued to recognize the existence
of Indian customary law. 8 5 Bennett v. Fink Construction Co.8 6
exemplifies the present position of state courts on the applicability of
customary law to disputes over ownership of reservation land. Plain-
tiff, daughter of a Seneca father and a Cayuga mother, claimed that she
177. Id. at 1029-30, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 628-29.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1030, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 629.
180. Id.
181. See note 143 supra.
182. 44 Misc. 2d at 1031, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 630; accord, In re Jimerson, 22
App. Div. 2d 417, 255 N.Y.S.2d 959 (3d Dep't 1965). Contra, Velez v. Huff, 48
Misc. 2d 10, 263 N.Y.S.2d 967 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
183. 44 Misc. 2d at 1031, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 630.
184. Id. at 1032, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 631.
185. See Mount Pleasant v. Patterson, 276 App. Div. 819, 820, 93 N.Y.S.2d 451,
452 (4th Dep't 1949) (per curiam) (acknowledging that normally customary law
would govern distribution and descent of tribal land although the court would not
respect practice of letting Tuscarora tribal council decide such matters); Jones Cut
Stone Co. v. State, 7 Misc. 2d 1048, 1052, 166 N.Y.S.2d 742, 746 (Ct. C1. 1957)
(dictum); Dixon v. State, 4 Misc. 2d 76, 77, 155 N.Y.S.2d 723, 724 (Ct. Cl. 1956).
186. 47 Misc. 2d 283, 262 N.Y.S.2d 331 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
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had inherited her father's land on the Cattaraugus reservation. Seeking
an injunction to prevent the Fink Construction Company from build-
ing on her land, she alleged that defendant was a trespasser.18 7 The
Senecas' surrogate court had already decided that the plaintiff had no
inherited right to Seneca land since she was a Cayugan. The state court
therefore refused to grant the injunction, stating that it had no power
to disregard customary law and overrule the decision of the tribal
court. 88 The court also noted that even though section 233189 per-
mitted state courts jurisdiction within the reservation, the customs
and decisions of Indian tribes could still be respected. 190
In re Stakel 9' presented a similar issue involving an Indian
woman born of a Tonawanda father and a Seneca mother. The Tona-
wanda chiefs sought her removal from the reservation, arguing that al-
though she was a Seneca, she was not a Tonawanda Seneca, and thus
had no right to reside on Tonawanda land. The appellate division de-
termined that the Tonawandas were genealogically part of the Seneca
Nation and therefore concluded the woman had a right to reside on
the reservation under both state and customary law. 92 The Court of
Appeals, apparently wishing to avoid a determination of the rights of
Senecas to reside on the Tonawanda reservation, affirmed on the theory
that the chiefs had previously given permission to the woman's mother
which was still binding. 193
The above cases demonstrate that state courts will not interfere
with the functions of peacemakers' courts, once jurisdiction has been
properly assumed, and will usually assist in enforcing judgments of
tribal institutions. State law determines whether a tribal institution
which is capable of deciding disputes exists and the jurisdiction of that
institution. However, customary law, rather than state law, generally
governs the distribution and descent of property. On the whole, the
federal legislation does not appear to have substantially affected the
powers of tribal institutions. Those reservations which managed their
own affairs prior to 1952 still do so today; those reservations that had
no peacemakers' courts still do not have them. The outlines of tribal
187. Id. at 284, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 332-33.
188. Id. at 285, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 333.
189. See note 69 supra.
190. 47 Misc. 2d at 285, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 334.
191. 281 App. Div. 183, 119 N.Y.S.2d 133 (4th Dep't 1953), aff'd, 306 N.Y.
679, 117 N.E.2d 355 (1954) (per curiam).
192. Id. at 185, 119 N.Y.S.2d at 135.
193. 306 N.Y. at 680-81, 117 N.E.2d at 356.
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sovereignty were formed in centuries past and the present state of
affairs seems likely to persist unless an impetus for change comes from
the tribal leadership.
CONCLUSION
New York has respected its Indians' right to self-determination in
varying degrees, depending for the most part on whether the powers
of tribal institutions were defined in the Indian Law. Although New
York tribes do not enjoy the degree of tribal sovereignty that some
western tribes do,194 most have managed to retain some form of tribal
government, and the potential for an increase in tribal control appears
to exist.
The prospects for successfully strengthening and expanding the
role of tribal government would seem to be far better today than they
were at the time of the congressional hearings in 1948. The principal
reason for this is the shift from a policy of assimilation to one of
greater respect for the Indians' right to self-determination. As noted
above, the federal government and the Supreme Court have demon-
strated their willingness to allow Indians greater control over tribal
affairs, sometimes at the expense of state jurisdiction.195 There are
indications that New York is willing to do the same. A few recent
state court decisions have stressed the existence of a public policy in
maintaining the distinctiveness of New York tribes. 96 The Joint Com-
mittee had, on numerous occasions, indicated a willingness to endorse
legislation aimed at modernizing Indian government, and indeed was
instrumental in obtaining the passage of legislation which strengthened
tribal government. 197 New York Indians are consulted about legisla-
tion which affects them and are given an opportunity to propose new
legislation 98
Some of the contentions made by state officials at the time New
York was seeking federal legislation, if valid when made, are dearly
194. For example, the Navaho have greater control over their own affairs than
do New York tribes. Cf. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
195. See notes 4-11 supra, & accompanying text.
196. See note 175 supra, & accompanying text.
197. See JOINT Co.ITTEE, N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 38 at 3-5 (1958); id., N.Y. LEG.
Doc. No. 49 at 6-7 (1956); id., N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 66 at 5-6 (1951); cf. id., N.Y.
LEG. Doc. No. 39 at 7-8 (1949).
198. Interview with Ellsworth George, Chief of the Council of the Tonawanda
Band of Senecas, at the Tonawanda reservation in Akron, N.Y., July 11, 1972.
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less valid today. For example, it was argued that it was not feasible to
allow Indians criminal and civil jurisdiction over their own affairs,
given the small size of the reservations, the absence of skilled person-
nel capable of establishing and operating a government, and the lack
of financial resources required for self-government. 19 Size might be
an important factor in determining the degree of self-government that
a reservation could exercise, but it is not a factor which eliminates
the possibility of any self-government at all. It is doubtful that reser-
vations would deem it feasible to have complete and exclusive juris-
diction over their criminal and civil affairs even if it were possible.
It seems more probable that a number of Indian leaders who favor
a change in the present situation would prefer to see a gradual ex-
pansion of their tribes' concurrent jurisdiction, or perhaps a fairly
limited acquisition of exclusive jurisdiction. Secondly, law schools
might be able to furnish the legal expertise that would be required
to expand the present roles of tribal government.200 Lastly, the need
for greater financial resources would be proportionate to the expansion
of the functions of tribal government. Thus, a limited and gradual
expansion might not overburden the resources of the reservations.201
Expansion of the role of tribal government may not prove as un-
acceptable to non-Indian society as the letter from the bank president
discussed earlier 202 seemed to suggest. The letter was a reaction to the
Forness decision which appeared to hold invalid all state law that had
theretofore applied to New York Indians. A limited expansion of the
powers of tribal government would not create a risk in any way
comparable to the risk that members of the financial community may
have perceived. If financial risks were to arise in conjunction with the
expansion of the role of tribal government, it might be possible for
state or federal governments to assume the risk. For example, at present
there is a housing improvement program operating on some New
199. See note 104 supra, & accompanying text.
200. The Faculty of Law and Jurisprudence at the State University of New York
at Buffalo has consulted with the Tonawanda Indians concerning codification of their
customary laws. See note 205 infra, & accompanying text.
201. The Senecas and Tonawandas may be able to afford a substantial expansion
of governmental functions if they can use the approximately 2.5 million dollars that
they were recently awarded by the Indian Claims Commission for such purposes. See
Seneca Nation of Indians v. United States, 28 Indian Cl. Comm. 12 (1972). Tribal gov-
ernments are also entitled to share in the federal funds provided for by the State and
Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972. 86 Stat. 919, § 108(b) (4) (U.S. CODE CoNo. &
AD. NEWS, 92d Cong. 2d Sess. 5568 (1972)).
202. See note 125 supra, & accompanying text.
1016
COMMENTS
York reservations which is partially subsidized by New York State,
and which has assumed the risk that a private entrepreneur might
have encountered in such a project.20 3
The decision as to whether a change in the present state of affairs
is desirable, and if so to what extent, is a decision which must rest with
tribal leaders. This comment does not address itself to that issue; how-
ever, the following suggestions may be useful to those who wish to ex-
plore the possibilities for change.
(1) Before any proposals for strengthening tribal government
can be suggested to the state legislature, there is a need to inventory
the functions of tribal governments and to assess the efficiency with
which they are performed. The 1948 congressional hearings provided
the latest detailed information on the operation of tribal governments.
Some of the problems brought to light in the hearings may exist today.
There is evidence, for example, that peacemakers' courts still experi-
ence difficulty in enforcing their decrees with the result that Indians
are encouraged to use town justices and state courts to settle their
differences. 204
(2) Consideration should be given to recording customary laws.
The absence of a written tribal code was one factor which appeared
to work to the disadvantage of Indians who opposed the federal legis-
lation during the course of the congressional hearings. There may be
additional reasons for recording customary laws today. Some of these
reasons were mentioned by the leadership of the Tonawanda reserva-
tion during a discussion of the desirability of recording their tribal
customs. 2 5 The tribal leaders believed that it would be desirable to
record them for the younger generation. Furthermore, they thought that
203. Interview with Dr. Raymond Hunt, consultant to the Tonawanda Indians
on the housing improvement program, in Buffalo, N.Y., Aug. 3, 1972.
204. In a recent unreported case involving a dispute over the ownership of prop-
erty located on the Tonawanda reservation, the peacemakers' court decided that the
plaintiff was the rightful owner on the basis of a disposition made at a Dead Feast.
The defendant continued to claim ownership and initiated an action in a town justice
court. The case did not proceed to trial, but the situation at least demonstrates the
inability of the Tonawanda peacemakers' court to enforce its decisions in this instance.
Furthermore, the attorney for the defendant in the town court action indicated that had
the action been pursued, the justice might have improperly assumed jurisdiction (the
peacemakers' having already asserted jurisdiction) and decided the case without refer-
ence to customary law. Interview with Richard Yunker, attorney for the Tonawanda
Band of Senecas, in Oakfield, N.Y., July 28, 1972.
205. Interview with Ellsworth George and Corbett Sundown, chiefs of the




if customs were recorded, residents of the reservation would be better
informed of the law and stricter accountability for violations would
be possible. It is conceivable that the due process requirements of the
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968206 could require reversal of convic-
tions for violating unwritten rules of law.
(3) Some reservations may wish to consider adopting a tribal
constitution as the Senecas did in 1848. In 1948, the absence of a writ-
ten charter defining the powers of the council of chiefs and other
tribal institutions made it difficult for Indians to convince the law-
makers that an efficient system of tribal government operated on the
reservations.207 Furthermore, the case analysis demonstrates that the
Seneca peacemakers' courts, which were provided for in the Seneca
constitution and the Indian Law, were recognized by state courts as
having jurisdiction over the disposition of property. Reservations
which had not established courts by means of a constitution or state
statute were deprived of jurisdiction.
(4) All reservations which have judicial institutions active in
settling disputes should insure that these institutions operate justly
and according to recognized principles of tribal law. Since state courts
have concurrent jurisdiction with tribal courts, Indians have the op-
tion of suing in either. Given this option, it is obvious that Indians
will make greater use of state courts if they cannot expect a just deci-
sion from a tribal court, with the resultant disuse of tribal courts
and their eventual disappearance. State courts will, of course, refuse
to enforce tribal court judgments that have been arrived at in a man-
ner which violates public policy.
In order to encourage the use of tribal courts, tribal leaders might
consider affording standing to all Indians who reside on the reserva-
tion .208 The leadership should also search for ways to strengthen its
power to enforce the decisions of the court or council. Perhaps a
greater range of community sanctions could be employed, or state
legislation could enlarge the powers of tribal marshals.209
206. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (1970).
207. See notes 111-14 supra, & accompanying text.
208. This suggestion is based on information contained in the congressional hear-
ings on section 233. See note 116 supra, & accompanying text. Changes may have
occurred since that time.
209. The Allegany, Cattaraugus and Tonawanda reservations are the only reserva-
tions to have tribal marshals; their duties are set forth by state statute. N.Y. INDIAN
LAW § 53 (McKinney 1950).
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(5) In the event that an internal dispute divides the leadership
of a reservation, an inter-tribal organization should be consulted first
for purposes of arbitration.210 The Six Nations Council2 1 might be
well suited to perform this function if it does not do so already. Al-
lowing the state to decide which of two contending groups is the
legitimate government of a reservation strengthens the role of the
state as a dominant force in Indian internal affairs.
In conclusion, it is suggested that if New York Indians wish
greater self-determination, they should analyze the roles performed by
tribal governments, decide whether expansion of those roles is desirable,
and then explore ways in which existing institutions might be
strengthened or new institutions created. Recent trends in Indian af-
fairs at both the state and federal levels suggest that self-determina-
tion may be more easily attained today than in the past.
JAMES W. CLUTE
210. From statements made in a Joint Committee report, it appears that the
state may have assumed the role of final arbiter in the leadership dispute which existed
at the time of the congressional hearings on the Tonawanda and Saint Regis reserva-
tions. JOINT COMMITTEE, N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 51 at 5 (1945).
211. The Six Nations Council is comprised of representatives of those tribes which
were members of the Iroquois Confederacy. In 1930 the council opposed a bill sub-
mitted to the House of Representatives which would have transferred jurisdiction
over Indian affairs from the federal government to the State of New York. R. CODD,
JR., BRIEF OF THE Six NATIONS COUNCIL, SENECA COUNCIL, TONAWANDA COUNCIL,
TUSCARORA COUNCIL AND CERTAIN INDIVIDUAL INDIANS OF THE Six NATIONS CON-
FEDERACY (1930) (position paper presented to the United States Congress). The council
also opposed passage of sections 232 and 233. 1948 Hearings 165.
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